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False sanctuary: the australian antarctic
Whale sanctuary and long-term stability in antarctica
by Donald K. Anton*

T

introDuction

he 1959 Antarctic Treaty1 and the subsequent allied
international legal agreements (and related measures)
that comprise the Antarctic Treaty System (“ATS”),2
is fast approaching its golden
anniversary.3 From a contemporary perspective, it is hard to
imagine Antarctica without some
established form of legal governance—a non-juridical Antarctica. Like a number of other
perceived essentials, it seems
certain if the ATS did not exist,
“it would have to be invented.”4
This is especially true today when
global contact with Antarctica in
terms of science, exploration,
exploitation of marine resources,
and tourism continues to expand
and grow in importance.5 In these circumstances, the presence
of effective regulation which serves as a driver of international
cooperation is more and more imperative.
As attention to Antarctica has increased over the past
forty-nine years, the ATS has been subject to periodic pressures
and tensions, but especially so since the end of the 1970s. From
at least 1975, differences (sometimes acrimonious) concerning Antarctic resources, access, and governance began to make
themselves felt between and across groups of claimant and nonclaimant states,6 parties and non-parties,7 and developed and
developing states.8 The ATS, however, has proved remarkably
resilient. As an early example of a “framework” treaty,9 it has
withstood some formidable challenges to both its legitimacy
and effectiveness.10 In contemporary international environmental law circles, the ATS is one of the two treaty regimes11 most
often cited as an example of success.12 Its collective value is
rightly viewed as much “greater than just the sum of its various
parts.”13 Given the underlying stakes in Antarctica—including
contentious issues tied to: (1) latent (but certainly not forgotten) territorial claims; (2) the exercise of jurisdiction; and (3)
governance decision-making—the ability of the ATS to adapt
and retain currency has been remarkable and holds a number of
lessons in normativity and diplomacy.14
The ATS though, like everything else, has vulnerabilities.15
Given the right set of circumstances, the equilibrium of the ATS
could be upset, with resulting turmoil within the system and
increasing pressures from outside. Over the life of the ATS, dif-

ficult political circumstances have occasioned others to sound
the alarm at times of increased tensions.16 It is not difficult to see
why. It seems hard to argue that the failure of the ATS would be
anything but bad; not least because there is no existing alternative
vehicle for international cooperation and governance in Antarctica.17 Among other things,
the failure of the ATS would
create international instability, uncertainty, and increased
tensions in relation to Antarctic activities and resources. It
would no doubt see the revival
of competing, conflicting, and
unrecognized claims that have
been “frozen” for nearly fifty
years.18 Today’s claims, however, would be pressed in a
world where increasing population and resource scarcity are much greater than when the claims
were “frozen.” It is easy to imagine the heightened instability,
competition, and tension this would create. Accordingly, threats
to the ATS pose serious risks and ought to be avoided.
While the ATS is not near collapse, or even nearing crisis, the recent assertion of maritime jurisdiction by Australian
courts over a Japanese whaling company for acts contrary to
Australian law in the Antarctic Southern Ocean is alarming.19
The exercise of jurisdiction by Australia over non-nationals in
this way makes its claim of territorial sovereignty in Antarctica
real again. As Professor Bilder noted, “so long as jurisdictional
rights are restricted [to nationals in Antarctica,] the issues of territorial claims remain largely theoretical.”20 Once the genie is
out of the bottle, it has the potential to excite in other states a
new “territorial temptation”21 seaward in Antarctica, and with it,
the potential for a fundamental destabilization of the ATS.

The failure of the ATS
would create international
instability, uncertainty,
and increased tensions
in relation to Antarctic
activities and resources.
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The humane SocieTy
inTernaTional liTigaTion22
On January 15, 2008, the Federal Court of Australia issued
declaratory relief and an injunction against Kyodo Senpaku
Kaisha Ltd. (“Kyodo”), a Japanese whaling company operating in the Southern Ocean, including in the Australian Whale
Sanctuary (“AWS”) within a claimed Exclusive Economic Zone
(“EEZ”) off the Australian Antarctic Territory (“AAT”). The
court declared that Kyodo had breached sections 229–232 and
238 of the Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) (“EPBC Act”) by killing, treating, and possessing whales in the AWS in the EEZ adjacent to the AAT.23 It
also enjoined Kyodo from the further killing, injuring, taking, or
interfering with any Antarctic minke whale, fin whale, or humpback whale in the AWS adjacent to the AAT.24

ApplicAtion for leAve to Serve proceSS in JApAn
The case was brought in 2004 by Humane Society International (“HSI”), which sued Kyodo for alleged illegal whaling
under Australian federal law, seeking the declaration and injunction ultimately granted.25 The law giving rise to the action,
including legal standing for HSI,26 is found in the EPBC Act.27
The AWS is established under section 225, Part 13, Division 3,
Subdivision B of the Act. By virtue of sections 5(1), 5(4), and
5(5) of the EPBC Act, section 8 of the Australian Antarctic Territory Act 1954 (Cth), section 10 of the Seas and Submerged
Lands Act 1973 (Cth) and the 1994 Proclamation of the EEZ
adjacent to the AAT,28 the AWS applies to the declared AAT
EEZ. Sections 229 and 230 of the EPBC Act make it unlawful to
kill, injure, take, interfere with, treat, or possess whales without
an Australian permit, within the AWS.29 The offence provisions
expressly apply to both Australian nationals and non-nationals
within the AWS, but only to non-nationals beyond the outer limits of the AWS.30
One of the elements that the applicant had to satisfy in order
to be granted leave to serve process in Japan was that the violation complained of took place “in the Commonwealth.”31 Such
an investigation, while dictated by Australian law, is also necessary in determining the international legality of the exercise of
Australian prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction in relation
to the AAT EEZ. Initially, Justice Allsop was prepared to treat
as conclusive the determination of the boundaries of the Commonwealth by the Executive Branch of government, including
the EEZ.32
Before denying the initial application for leave to serve process, Justice Allsop took the extraordinary step of inviting the
amicus curiae intervention of the Attorney-General to provide
the government’s views on the application of “legislation and
treaties involved . . . in light of what might be seen to be Australia’s national interest, including . . . relations between Australia
and Japan.”33 The Attorney-General stated that “an assertion of
jurisdiction by an Australian court over claims concerning rights
and obligations in the [EEZ of the AAT] would or may provoke an international disagreement with Japan, undermine the
status quo attending the Antarctic Treaty, and ‘be contrary to
Spring 2008

Australia’s long term national interests.’”34 According to Justice
Allsop, this view was based on the recognition of three realities by the government. First, Japan would regard enforcement
of the EPBC Act against Japanese vessels and its nationals in
the AAT EEZ as a breach of international law.35 Second, the
exercise of enforcement jurisdiction against foreigners generally in the AAT EEZ, based on the Australian territorial claim,
would “prompt a significant adverse reaction from other Antarctic Treaty Parties.”36 Third, the Australian government has not
enforced the Australian law in Antarctica against the nationals
of other state parties, except where there has been voluntary submission to Australian law.37
In accepting that exercising jurisdiction might upset diplomatic concord under the Antarctic Treaty and be contrary to
Australia’s national interest, Justice Allsop also stated that any
injunctive relief granted would ultimately be futile because of
“the difficulty, if not impossibility, of enforcement of any court
order”38 and could place the Federal Court “at the centre of an
international dispute . . . between Australia and friendly foreign
power.”39 As a result, Allsop ruled that he “should not exercise
a discretion to place the Court in such a position” and denied the
application for leave to serve process in Japan.40
Significantly, following the intervention of the AttorneyGeneral, Allsop appeared prepared to return to consider the merits of the validity of the Australian claim to jurisdiction in the
AAT EEZ as a predicate to granting or denying leave to serve
process related to an event occurring “in the Commonwealth.”
Allsop raised the issue of whether all “the area” of Southern
Ocean south of 60º South Latitude, in which the AAT EEZ is
claimed, is high seas (in which an EEZ may not exist) because
Article VI of the Antarctic Treaty protects “the rights . . . of any
State under international law with regard to the high seas within
that area.” 41 In fact, however, it seems that Allsop was really
interested in how Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty and its prohibition on making any “new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica” might bear on
the proclamation of Australia to an Antarctic EEZ in 1994.
In particular, Allsop noted the submission by the AttorneyGeneral that there is a distinction between the “enlargement of
an existing claim to territorial sovereignty” and the claim of
Australia to an Antarctic EEZ:
it was submitted on behalf of the Attorney-General,
[that] the claim of Australia to the Antarctic EEZ is
not one of sovereignty in the full sense over the waters
adjacent to the Antarctic Territory (except for the territorial sea), but of claims . . . to exercise the rights of
exploitation, conservation, management and control,
and enforcement thereof, given to coastal States by
UNCLOS. . . . The recognition of the limitations (short
of full claims to sovereignty) of Australia’s claims to the
Antarctic EEZ becomes important in assessing whether
. . . the acts of the respondent and the contraventions
of the EPBC Act took place “in the Commonwealth.”42
In the end, however, Allsop did not decide on the operative
effect of Article IV of the Treaty in relation to the declared AAT
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EEZ. Instead, he used the submission by the Attorney-General
to contrast it with the contrary position of Japan (and most of
the rest of the world). Allsop noted that “[a]s far as Japan is
concerned, the Australian Antarctic EEZ is the high seas which
is not subject to any legitimate control by Australia under
UNCLOS and domestic legislation provided for thereby (such
as the EPBC Act).”43 The conflicting positions thus contrasted,
Allsop accepted the Attorney-General’s position that
international discord that
would follow by granting
leave to serve process and
it became “unnecessary to
decide whether the Antarctic
EEZ is, or can be seen as, ‘in
the Commonwealth.’ ” 44
Significantly too, Allsop
noted cultural differences
with respect to whaling and
hinted that the current stigma
attached to whaling might
signal a move away from
conservation and sustainable
utilization to a wish by some
to preserve charismatic megafauna at all costs.45 Allsop
explained:
The whales being killed . . . are seen by some as not
merely a natural resource that is important to conserve, but as living creatures of intelligence and of
great importance not only for the animal world, but
for humankind and that to slaughter them . . . is deeply
wrong. These views are not shared by all. . . . They
are views which, at an international level, are mediated
through the Whaling Commission and its procedures,
by reference to the Whaling Convention and the views
of nation States. They are views . . . that contain a number of normative and judgmental premises . . . which
do not arise in any simple application of domestic law,
but which do, or may, arise in a wider international
context.46

The majority held that the action was made clearly justiciable by the Australian Parliament under the EPBC Act and
related authority. The court had clear jurisdiction. The applicant
had clear standing. Accordingly, jurisdiction could be assumed
by service or submission and questions of futility would arise,
if at all, at the time of the issuance of injunctive or declaratory
relief.

The TriAl

Expanding jurisdiction
this dramatically
is clearly inconsistent
with uniform past
Australian practice not to
enforce Australian laws
against non-nationals in
Antarctica.

The AppeAl
On appeal, a Full Bench of the Federal Court reversed Justice Allsop. Taking a more dualistic, traditional approach to the
underlying legal and international relations issues, none of the
appellate judges gave any weight to the international political
considerations raised by the Attorney-General. Even the dissent
was in agreement on this point, stating that:
[c]ourts must be prepared to hear and determine matters
whatever their political sensitivity either domestically
or internationally. To approach the matter otherwise,
is to compromise the role of the courts as a forum in
which rights can be vindicated whatever the subject
matter of the proceedings.47
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On remand, the matter was
heard in September 2007. Kyodo,
as expected, did not appear. Instead
of relying on a default, HSI proceeded to prove the facts supporting its claim for declarative and
injunctive relief. Following the
guidance provided by the majority
of the Full Federal Court on Appeal
regarding public interest injunctions, Allsop granted the declaration and injunction sought by HSI.
This, of course, raises the prospect
of contempt proceedings in Australian courts if Kyodo does not comply with the injunction in future
whaling seasons.48 It also raises
the question of whether the Federal government is prepared to
enforce the injunction in the event of violation by intercepting
and seizing Kyodo ships operating in the AAT EEZ. Indeed, it
has the potential to bring the unilateral exercise of Australia prescriptive, adjudicative, and enforcement jurisdiction to bear on
ships and individuals in an area that almost all other states view
as the high seas and, if they are correct, are thus subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state.49
Expanding jurisdiction this dramatically is clearly inconsistent with uniform past Australian practice not to enforce Australian laws against non-nationals in Antarctica.50 Yet, in the 2007
national election campaign, the newly elected Labor government pledged to “enforce Australian law banning the slaughter
of whales in the Australian Whale Sanctuary.”51 Additionally,
the Australian Government Solicitor wrote to Justice Allsop in
December 2007 during the trial of the HSI case on instructions
from the new Attorney-General. The letter stated that the court
should not rely on the views of the Attorney-General of the previous government. Instead, the letter highlighted that the new
“Government believes that the matter would best be considered
by the Court without the Government expressing its view.”52
During the 2007–2008 Southern Hemisphere summer whaling season that has just ended, the Australian government dispatched the Oceanic Viking to monitor whaling in the Southern
Ocean, but it neither intercepted nor seized any Japanese whaler
operating in the AAT EEZ. The government claimed that the
Oceanic Viking was being used to collect evidence that might
be used in international litigation challenging the lawfulness of
Japanese whaling for “scientific purposes” under the InternaSuStainable Development law & policy

tional Convention for the Regulation of Whaling.53 But, given
the current government’s position, one is still left to wonder if
it is only a matter of time before the Australian government will
act against Japanese ships and Japanese nationals in the AAT
EEZ. This makes it opportune, for the remainder of this Article,
to consider the implications of such a possibility for stability in
Antarctic governance.

implicationS for atS Stability
The HSI case establishes that the application and enforcement of the AWS provisions as applied to the AAT under the
EPBC Act in a private action, against Australian non-nationals,
by Australian courts, is not barred by Australian law.54 From
an international law perspective, this is unfortunate. It is even
more so when one considers the
ramifications for the stability of
the ATS.
In thinking about the use of
jurisdiction established under
Antarctic claims to territory and
maritime zones as a way to provide protection to whales in the
Southern Ocean, it is necessary
to consider the nature of that
jurisdiction. In turn, this requires
a consideration of the ways in
which both sovereignty and jurisdiction have been addressed by
the ATS. In relation to the sovereignty issue, it is important to recognize that Article IV of the
Antarctic Treaty55 has not solved the conflict so much as it has
structured a form of words that allow all parties to ambiguously
look past the issue of territorial claims in order to identify with
each other on agreed objectives.56 The admonition of Professor
Watts is worth repeating here:
It does not overstate the case to say that Article IV is
the cornerstone of the Antarctic Treaty and thus of the
whole system that has grown up around it. The effectiveness of that article has . . . kept Antarctica free of
the conflicts to which its complex territorial situation
would have been most likely to lead and generally has
removed it from the usual range of international political tensions.
Yet, however satisfactory the results of Article IV
have been so far, there are certain limits to its operation
and effectiveness. These limits are sometimes obscured
by the very success that Article IV has so far had and
the tendency to get around its complex drafting by summarizing its broad effect by some such phrase as that it
“suspends sovereignty claims” in Antarctica or that it
has put “sovereignty in abeyance.”
What is important to always bear in mind is that
the various national claims to and rights of sovereignty in Antarctica are still very much alive – as is
equally the opposition to them of those states that do

not recognize them. The underlying differences of view
remain. In that sense, Article IV has not “solved” the
problem. What it has done is provide a basis on which
conflicts arising out of those continuing differences can
be avoided.
. . . Take Article IV away, and sovereignty rights
and claims, and opposition to them, will immediately
re-emerge, undiminished in vigor. In an extreme case,
involving in some way the Antarctic Treaty or at least
Article IV ceasing to be in force, the consequential possibility of a resurgence of conflicts over sovereignty is
readily apparent.57
It is precisely this situation that the HSI case threatens.
Absent agreement of the parties to introduce positive rules
related to the exercise of jurisdiction in the Treaty Area over
non-nationals,58 it seems almost
certain that Australia’s assertion of maritime jurisdiction
over non-nationals will at the
least create conditions for dispute and discord. If other states
were to follow Australia’s
lead, in a worst case scenario,
it might mean the end of the
ATS altogether and the revival
of old claims and assertion of a
host of new claims. As Gillian
Triggs observed in 1985:
Were Australia or any other claimant state to give effect
to their views of Article IV of [Antarctic] Convention
by, for example, exercising the customary jurisdiction
of a coastal state in relation to waters adjacent to its
sectoral claim in Antarctica, it is likely that the Convention would break down.59
It is important to note that the ATS does not seek to regulate
Antarctica and its marine environment in its entirety. Indeed,
whales are expressly excluded from the ATS in a number of
places and it is important to bear in mind that there are existing multilateral agreements that are both consistent with the
ATS and do apply to whales in the seas adjacent to Antarctica.
The purpose of this Article is not to identify all of these agreements.60 Rather, the argument here is that the contentious and
almost entirely unrecognized exercise of jurisdiction within the
ATS over non-nationals in waters adjacent to Antarctica for the
purpose of regulating whaling is unsound. It is likely to lead to
less overall environmental protection in Antarctica if it engenders conflict and competition.
The crux of the HSI dispute (and any progeny it brings
forth) is whaling. The long-running battle between the antiwhaling forces and whalers is being played out in Australian
courts because of the failure to address the issues within what
is seen as a “dysfunctional” whaling regime.61 However, the
Australian litigation involves what most other states will view
as the unlawful exercise of Australian jurisdiction (based on its

The long-running
battle between the
anti-whaling forces and
whalers is
being played out
in Australian courts.
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Antarctic claim) in the Southern Ocean. This raises the very real
prospect that the ongoing whaling dispute will have a detrimental “ripple effect” on the ATS (and perhaps even beyond).62
Whaling is largely comprised of politics revolving around
a single issue. The danger is that the issue of whales and whaling might distort and obscure the larger environmental picture
in Antarctica. This is especially true when contemporary international negotiations on whales and whaling within the International Whaling Commission (“IWC”) often appear in many
ways to be meant for consumption of domestic political constituencies.63 Fundamental tensions will be created within the
ATS if the battle over the whaling issue is brought within. By
disrupting set patterns of jurisdiction that provide a fundamental
cornerstone for the ATS, the whaling issue will reverberate, and
not likely to the good, in the system.
I want to emphasize that most of my sympathy lies with the
plaintiff’s reasonable objectives in the litigation we are considering.64 It is certain that ensuring the perpetuation of whales in
the Southern Ocean is important. However, this worthy goal is
only a small part of the common interest of all humankind in the
protection and sustainable use of the wider Antarctic environment (marine and terrestrial). Because of this broader common
interest, I depart with HSI and its lawyers when we look at the
means employed to reach the specific objective of perpetuation.
My departure is not so much driven by HSI and its lawyers as it
is by the legal tools put at their disposal by the Commonwealth
Parliament of Australia in form of the Environment Protection
Biodiversity Conservation Act of 1998.
Private litigation, based on an internationally disputed claim
to sovereignty over Antarctic territory and a further contested
claim to an EEZ appurtenant to that territory, ought not to serve
as a proxy for cooperative (and hopefully effective) international
management of the Antarctic environment. The negative incentives presented by such an extreme unilateral measure are just
too dangerous. That is not to say other, less provocative unilateral measures need to be avoided. Indeed, in the appropriate circumstances unilateral measures can be viewed as international
leadership.65 Lower level, less contentious, unilateral measures
might present a possible way forward in the establishment of
effective international management.
Instead of a unilateral Australian approach, what is required
is a more concerted multilateral attempt to address the issue of
whales and whaling through the whaling regime established by
the 1946 International Convention on the Regulation of Whaling. Even if such an attempt involves a difficult and long drawn
out process, or even if the deadlock remains, a continuing interregnum of uncertainty and contest within the whaling regime66
is better than destabilizing the ATS—an extremely important
regime of broader scope and objective.

concluSion
It is a truism that good faith cooperation between states is
required to successfully tackle environmental and resource problems which are international in scope.67 In the case of whale
stocks, a res nullius common property resource,68 cooperation is
required on account of the externalities that have driven unsustainable exploitation.
It is well-known that over the past ten years or so, the struggle between the conservation and utilisation camps within the
IWC has intensified as stocks (at least minke whale stocks) have
apparently been gradually replenished since the whaling moratorium.69 This increasingly acrimonious struggle seriously threatens the normative effectiveness of the Whaling Convention and
the IWC. By comparison to the IWC, the ATS has been relatively stable since controversy raged around the issue of minerals exploration and exploitation in the 1980s.
The recent HSI case, and the broader context in which it
arises, has the potential to dangerously destabilize the ATS. At
the bottom, this potential is driven by the somewhat jaded, but
I believe basically accurate perspective expressed by Wilbert
Chapman in 1969. Chapman said:
The nature of [humans] abhors something of value not
being owned by an individual, or by groups of individuals organized into states or business entities.70
This acquisitive view of human nature frames, in large part,
the centuries old argument about open and closed seas that all
lawyers of the sea are familiar with. This acquisitive habit lies
behind the capture and use of whales by the nationals of whaling
states, just as much as lies behind claims to sovereign rights in
natural resources in an EEZ off Antarctica. Indeed, the drive to
acquisition applies to all common Antarctic marine biological
resources and helps explain why states have entered into agreements that seek to frame principles for sharing these marine
resources. More troubling though, is that in what appears to be
coming times of increasing scarcity, this acquisitive habit will
apply with equal force to oil and mineral resources (and even
genetic material) found off-shore in Antarctica.71 For many, this
explains why the 1991 Madrid Protocol contains the Article 25
“escape clause” built around disagreement concerning mineral
resource activities.
This habit of acquisition, and the tendency to exclusive use
of what is thus acquired, highlights the great failing of Australia’s unilateral approach to the protection of the Antarctic marine
environment in this case; an approach predicated on a claim to
exclusive sovereign rights and the projection of Australian prescriptive, adjudicative, and enforcement jurisdiction in the zone.
The big danger is that if other states follow Australia’s lead in
claiming sovereign rights and exercising attendant jurisdiction
the chances of natural resource over-exploitation and environmental harm in the Antarctic is increased. It will, I believe, in the
long run exacerbate the likelihood of a scramble for important,
scarce and economically viable resources.
Endnotes: False Sanctuary continued on page 61
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enDnoteS: False sanctuary continued from page 21
1

The Antarctic Treaty, Dec.10, 1959, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.

2

See Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, Oct. 4,
1991, 30 I.L.M. 1455 (entered into force Jan. 14, 1998) (explaining that the
Antarctic Treaty System (“ATS”) is comprised of: (1) the Antarctic Treaty;
(2) the more than 200 measures in effect under the Treaty; and (3) associated
treaties, and their related measures, that are in force) [hereinafter Madrid
Protocol].
3

See the International Polar Year website, http://www.ipy.org/ (last visited
Apr. 10, 2008) (stating that the current 2007–08 International Polar Year
(IPY 07–08) represents the 50th Anniversary of the 1957–58 International
Geophysical Year (IGY 57–58) that culminated in the 1959 Antarctic Treaty);
see also Andrew C. Revkin, 2-Year Study of Polar Changes Set to Begin, N.Y.
times, Feb. 26, 2007, at A4; Celebrating the Anniversaries of the International
Polar Years and International Geophysical Year, 150 Cong. Rec. S. 11323,
108th Cong., 2d sess. (Oct. 11, 2004).
4

This phrase has been used frequently in the context of international
organization, highlighting the importance of international cooperation through
formalized structures. See, e.g., GeorG schwarzenberGer, Power Politics:
a study oF international society 748 (1951) (on the need for the United
Nations); Jean monnet, memoirs 509 (1978) (on the need for European
organization); Robert O. Keohane, The Demand for International Regimes,
36 int’l orGanization 325, 355 (1982) (on the need for international regimes
generally); M.H. Mendelson, Flux and Reflux of the Law of the Sea, 5 oxFord
J. leGal stud. 285 (1985) (on the need for a international legal regime for the
seas); John Garofano, Power, Institutions and the ASEAN Regional Forum,
42 asian surv. 502 (2002) (on the need for the ARF).
5

See generally rePort oF the u.s. antarctic ProGram external Panel,
the united states in antarctica (National Science Foundation, 1997); U.S.
House of Representatives, Hearings before the Committee on Science, 105th
Cong., The United States and Antarctica in the 21st Century, 1st sess., Mar.
12, 1997, at 6–11 (Statement of Norman R. Augustine); Marcus Haward et al.,
Australia’s Antarctic Agenda, 60 australian J. int’l aFF. 439 (2006); see also
handbook oF the antarctic treaty system, U.S. Department of State (9th ed.,
2002) (excluding a number of important Consultative Party recommendations,
resolutions, decisions and measures).
6

See arthur watts, international law and the antarctic treaty system
119–20 (1992). States purporting to exercise, assert or claim territorial
sovereignty are generally known as “claimant” states despite clear distinctions
between “exercise, assert or claim.” “Non-claimant” states are those that do
not accept the validity of claims that have been made by other states and, in
addition, neither advance a territorial claim themselves, nor (except for the
United States and Russia) assert a historic basis for doing so.

7

See Revised Rules of Procedure (2005), ATCM Decision 3 (June 17, 2005),
available at http://v3.ats.aq/documents/recatt/att264_e.pdf (last visited Apr. 10,
2008); see also F. M. Auburn, Consultative Status Under the Antarctic Treaty,
28 int’l & comP. l.Q. 514 (1979). This includes differences between the subgroups of Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, with powers of participation
and decision-making and Antarctic Treaty Non-Consultative Parties, without
such powers.
8

See Peter beck, the international Politics oF antarctica, 270–319 (1986).

9

See christoPher c. Joyner, GoverninG the Frozen commons: the
antarctic reGime and environmental Protection (1998) (explaining how the
framework principles of peace and science established by the 1959 Antarctic
Treaty have blossomed in subsequent regulation in the form of binding
“recommendations” – now known as measures under XIX: Decision 1 (1995) –
and the ATS conventions); watts, supra note 6; Gillian Triggs, The Antarctic
Treaty Regime: A Workable Compromise or a “Purgatory of Ambiguity?”,
17 case w. res. J. int’l l. 195, 199–208 (1985).
10

See olav schram stokke & davor vidas, GoverninG the antarctic: the
eFFectiveness and leGitimacy oF the antarctic treaty system 35, 37–45
(1996) (demonstrating accounts and analysis of the continuing effectiveness
and legitimacy of the ATS); arnFinn JøGensen-dahl & willy østrenG, the
antarctic treaty system in world Politics (1991) (discussing lessons to be
taken from the ATS model).
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11

See, e.g., ved P. nanda & GeorGe (rock) PrinG, international
environmental law For the 21st century 270 (2003) (pointing to regulating
ozone depleting substances); david hunter, James salzman & durwood
zaelke, international environmental law and Policy 526 (2d ed., 2002)
(stating that the ozone regime is “the most important precedent in international
law for the management of global environmental harms”).
12

See e.g., Donald R. Rothwell, Environmental Protection in Antarctica and
the Southern Ocean: A Post UNCED Perspective, in ocean law and Policy
in the Post-unced era: australian and canadian PersPectives, 327
(Kriwoken, Haward, VanderZwaag & Davis, eds., 1996) (stating that ATS
is “one of the most successful international law regimes in recent history”);
Richard Falk, The Antarctic Treaty System: Are There Viable Alternatives?, in
the antarctic treaty system in world Politics 399 (Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl
& Willy Ostreng, eds., 1991) (stating that “governance of Antarctica . . . is
the closest thing to ‘a world order miracle’ that the world has known”); Finn
Sollie, The Development of the Antarctic Treaty System: Trends and Issues, in
antarctic challenGe: conFlictinG interests, cooPeration, environmental
Protection, economic develoPment 25 ( Rüdiger Wolfrum, ed., 1984) (stating
that ATS is “so effective . . . that today it is easy to forget the tension and the
risks of political conflict and the dangers of military intervention that did exist
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